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CURRENT SOVIET AIMS

- I. Soviet diplomacy, propaganda energetically aimed at--:
 - A. Frightening West out of German re-
 - 8. Impressing entire non-Communist world with strength, "peaceful" attitude of USSR.
- II. On rearmament issue, USSR searching for dramatic ways prevent ratification Paris accords, or at least raise Western doubts wisdom actually carrying out German rearmament.
 - A. First, pressure on France, Benelux,
 Britain, climaxed by 13 Jan notes to
 WEU countries.
 - Warned that accords would provide
 West Germany with ABC weapons in defiance Geneva convention:

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war specially threatening to

"Eur countries with great

density population."

- B. Next (15 Jan), efforts woo West

 Germans with--
 - 1. Offer of diplomatic relations;
 - 2. Hint (with weasel escapes) of Soviet okay for supervised all-German elections.
 - 3. Both offers contingent on German rejection Paris accords. Also declared direct contact with Moscow only road to reunification.
- C. In addition such overt gestures, probable that USSR covertly responsible for rash of recent "war imminence" rumors,
 - l. Example--6 Jan Dutch labor leader's claim that "battle signal" had been given, USSR start preventive war

rather than see west flor any rearmed Approved For Release 2002/05/07 CIA-RDR 79R00890 A000 500 10008-3

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- 1. Avoided committing itself to a military counter-action in event

 German rearmament.
- Within Bloc, presumably because of FOPULAR FEAR -including some
 "panic-buying."
- E. Actual concrete Soviet moves--as

 distinct from propaganda--confined to

 harassment in Berlin, Austria.
 - Berlin--definite increase in checks on border-crossers.
 - Austria -- setting up check-points
 around Vienna, and thinly veiled
 threats to "partition" country.
- III. As token of "peaceful" intentions, USSR

 made two "dramatic" atomic energy announcements in last few days CONFIDENTIAL

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station data will be given to UN science conference in August.

- fissionable and atomic "know-how"
 would be given five Orbit states
 (China, East Germany, Czechoslovakia,
 Rumania, Poland--which now supplying
 USSR with atomic raw materials).
 - 1. Five will get research equipment

 (e.g-cyclotrons), assistance in

 building small experimental

 reactors, and fissionables

 required for power.
 - Can thus join Big Brother in "peaceful" development atomic power.
- c. Actions belatedly counter US "atom pool" plan, clear way for rival Soviet plan on international scale--including Communist China.

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Also soothe Satellite discontent over

Soviet exploitation nuclear resources

without return benefits.

- E. USSR already considering extending

 atomic offer to additional nations—

 probably including underdeveloped Asian

 countries where USSR now stressing

 offers of economic and technical

 assistance. One key target—India.
- F. Moscow can now back up such offers with atomic goods.

IV.	These	flexings	Soviet	diplomatic	muscles

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Fleet "units" will travel 5,000 miles
through Atlantic and Mediterranean in Feb
for combined maneuvers with Black Sea Fleet.
(Northern Fleet's major units--4 light
cruisers, 29 destroyers, 47 submarines).

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A. If major movement for the Apprecedented in history Soviet Navy.

- B. Such voyage would be mainly political "showing flag."
- C. Although voyage would offer US intelligence opportunities, also presents real intelligence challenge.
 - 1. Taking ships away from exposed northern coast and bottling them up in Black Sea would be persuasive indication USSR not expecting immediate war.
 - US would get valuable insight
 Soviet naval tactics, logistic
 support, air cover (if any), etc.
- D. Challenge to US intelligence would be need to reckon with precedent of Soviet forces (naval and possibly air) suddenly appearing in open Atlantic on demonstrably "peaceful" missions.

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Future might see frequent entries

Soviet forces in international

waters and airspace.

- Might provide cover for Soviet reconnaissance and even "spoof" air feelers aimed at US radar.
- 3. Thus poses tough problem US agencies studying "indications" and considering timely initiation US measures defend continental US.